It is the eve of the UK 2015 general election and in all likelihood we are heading for a hung parliament. If this is true then it will be the second hung parliament in a row. The strangle hold of Conservative and Labour demonstrating opposite ways of doing nothing for the people might well be at an end.
And as the minor parties with a sizeable proportion of the vote but not seeing it translated into seats in the House of Commons, the question of proportional representation (PR) will undoubtedly surface.
The last referendum giving the electorate the choice of the current First Past The Post system or the Alternative Vote (AV) was a sham. There are a number of PR systems much more representative of the people but we were not given the choice. This I think must change.
My version of PR, the Percentage Proportional Representation system was written after the 2001 general election. I change nothing so you can see what I offered more than 10 years ago. I sent a copy to the Electoral Reform Society; clearly not a polite bunch of people as I did not receive the courtesy of even an acknowledgment.
However, undaunted by the rejection, I present my solution to you again, unchanged in it's original concept. So for political parties who may wish to pursue the notion of proportional representation I am happy to discuss my proposal further - you might even get me to do a presentation.
#proportionalrepresentation #shanepward
#proportionalrepresentation #shanepward
Political Solutions
A New Voting System:
Percentage Proportional Representation
When I pitched this idea to the Electoral Reform Society they failed to comment. I suspect the reason might be because their version of proportional representation is actually inferior to mine. The reason for this, I suspect, lies in the fact that their system was invented in the 1800s and mine was invented alongside the benefit of computers and new technology. My proposal has the potential to represent 99% of the voting public according to their FIRST choice and regardless of what borough, county or shire they live in. And what is wrong with it? The politicians will only have a vote in Parliament that is as strong as the number of voters that voted them in and voters opposing the politics of the traditional 'safe seat' candidate will finally have a vote that actually counts. Honestly its true.
Introduction
For the sake of identification I have called this system the Percentage Proportional Representation system (PPR). It was designed with UK general elections in mind but may work just as well in local and other elections.
PPR is a system of proportional representation where the percentage of vote is considered more important than the limitations of a constituency boundary. Also the number of votes cast becomes more important than the number of MPs (Minister of Parliament) elected. In today’s technological age it is relatively simple for MPs to vote electronically with the percentage vote of their constituents instead of a show of hands or the rather disproportionate one MP one vote. This way the votes in Parliament are one step nearer to the democratic maxim of ‘one voter one vote’ rather than ‘one MP one distorted vote’ as it is now.
Under the 'First Past the Post' system (FPP) there are MPs almost resident in what may be termed ‘safe seats’. This is because the majority of people in some constituencies tend to vote traditionally for that political party. Consequently those who vote against the safe seat either do not have a representative voice in Parliament for as long as they reside in that constituency or may even see little point in even voting. PPR changes that by offering a possible MP seat for both the first and second candidate with further opportunities for representation from candidates coming third, fourth and even fifth. For this reason the constituency would have to be twice the size it is under FPP to ensure that the number of MPs in Parliament remains almost the same. However, one would also expect that voters will attend surgeries with their elected MP and thus the level of constituency work remains largely unchanged for individual MPs. Candidates coming second must have at least 25% of the constituency vote to be selected automatically as an MP and will also be active in the constituency/constituencies represented by the winning candidate.
Candidates coming second with less than 25% of the vote or candidates coming third or more may still become MPs by 'commandeering' votes from neighbouring constituencies or by accumulating an acceptable proportion of votes regionally or even nationally. This would allow minor parties a proportionate voice in Parliament and with a working and meaningful vote that could make a difference in terms of policy and law.
MPs at Parliament will vote only with the allocated percentage of votes that they represent, thus the amount of MPs is not as significant as the number of votes they are responsible for. Consequently it may be economically sensible for one MP to take to Parliament the votes of constituencies up to 75% of the lowest constituency turnout. It may also be reasonable to award MP salaries (and expenses) proportionate to their vote percentage responsibilities.
Rationale
The Percentage Proportional Representation voting system is based on the principle that the electorate not only has a choice of representatives but is often quite adamant that it is the only choice for them. So if their vote is to count it needs to be represented, if not by their constituency candidate of choice winning the Parliamentary seat then by a candidate representing at least the voter’s party preference.
In some constituencies there are ‘safe seats’ under the FPP system. The percentage of voters can often be high but not so high as to frequently exceed 75% (See Barnsley example 1997 below). Never the less, it is intended under the PPR system that a candidate with 75% of a constituency vote should be able to represent those voters with the strength of that percentage behind them (the number of constituency votes divided by the total vote for the country). What changes to the current FPP system under PPR is that the remaining 25%, who in some cases have never been represented by a candidate or party of their choice may now also be represented by a candidate or party of their choice. In the first instance this would be by the successful election of the second candidate as an MP as well as the first but with a voting power proportionate to their elected vote (which is also divided by the total number of voters nationally).
Should a percentage of votes won be insufficient in a constituency to warrant the position of full time MP (less than 25%), it is possible that there would be a sufficient vote by combining two constituencies, or regionally, or even nationally to allow some form of representation to be made in Parliament. If one political party can win at least 25% of the votes as a winning MP either regionally or nationally, they would be entitled to declare an MP for that region or for the country. This is particularly important in the UK for minor parties where some support is given but is spread widely across the country. Therefore hardly any vote is wasted and all votes cast are for the elector’s first choice only and the voter is not being asked to put up with second best (or should that be worst) or no representation at all.
To ensure that local MPs reflect the local vote, both the first and second candidates would become MPs by right* (See the votes for Cheadle. Example below). In the first instance this would mean doubling the size of the constituencies (to keep MP count at around 650 as it is now) but one constituency would now have two MPs instead of one, therefore the status quo to the current system is redressed except that the two old constituencies are now more fairly represented. Also, because MPs would vote in Parliament with their percentage of the electorate, there is no overall advantage to be gained by trying to slice up constituencies to gain a majority vote; especially in marginal seats. Clearly it would be more sensible to divide constituencies into natural boundaries of towns, cities, counties and rural districts.
*However, where one party wins by a majority of 75% or more it may be that the second place candidate cannot achieve 25% of the vote. In this case they may need to commandeer more votes by combining with a neighbouring constituency or concede their candidacy to a neighbouring constituency where the candidate has a greater vote percentage or greater votes, whichever is deemed to be fairer by the party leadership involved.
The Single Transferable Vote (STV) rationale (See Electoral Reform Society Web Site) notes that:
“all major parties have expressed concern at the desperately low representation of women and of ethnic minorities in Parliament.”
Under the PPR system the connotation of ‘safe seats’ becomes redundant. If a political party feels that a certain area would be best represented by a woman or an ethnic minority candidate it may choose to do so in the knowledge that even if their candidate were to come third they may still elect to have that representative commandeer a neighbouring constituency in order to command a sufficiently proportional vote as an MP for both constituencies.
“all major parties have expressed concern at the desperately low representation of women and of ethnic minorities in Parliament.”
Under the PPR system the connotation of ‘safe seats’ becomes redundant. If a political party feels that a certain area would be best represented by a woman or an ethnic minority candidate it may choose to do so in the knowledge that even if their candidate were to come third they may still elect to have that representative commandeer a neighbouring constituency in order to command a sufficiently proportional vote as an MP for both constituencies.
Major political parties have been known to campaign negatively in order to win their ‘seat’. Under PPR, negative campaigning is not so effective. The candidates under PPR will be campaigning to win a percentage of their electorate and even campaigning negatively will not keep the second placed candidate out of Parliament. Indeed it is likely that both the first and second place candidates will have to find ways to work together within local issues so positive campaigning and ‘working in partnership’ is likely to be encouraged.
Voters have been forced to vote for the least dreadful candidate or the manifesto that will least affect them personally. Faced often with voting for ‘bad’, ‘terrible, or ‘worse’ there are many voters, where under the FPP system their first choice has no chance of winning, who would rather not vote at all. This is the electoral apathy so often spoken about but - like everything else - never addressed properly. Some voters might be persuaded to come out and vote if there was a box marked ‘None of the above’. In the absence of such a box I cannot see that offering a second or third choice on the variation of ‘bad’ will encourage more people to vote. Only by offering the real opportunity of representation by their first choice will voters most likely make the effort to come out and make a difference. And this is a significantly fundamental difference between STV and PPR.
Like STV, the key point about PPR is that it reflects proportionally the individual’s voting intentions but goes further than STV by reflecting those electoral intentions and turning them into the Parliamentary representation. There is no need to complicate the voting system by second and third choice votes. PPR does not do this, which makes it simpler than STV for voters to understand because they only have to consider only one choice - their first choice – just as they would do now under FPP if they truly believed that their vote actually counted.
So what about those who are voted 3rd, 4th or even 5th under PPR? This is where it becomes important to consider the votes cast rather than the limitations of boundary.
In a tightly fought contest it is possible that the winner in a 120,000 constituency gets 35% of the vote (42,000), the second candidate 34% (40,800) and the third gets 29% (34,800). By coming first and second the two candidates with 35% and 34% are automatically selected for Parliament. The third candidate, however, may still become an MP by ‘commandeering’ the votes of a neighbouring constituency and consent to represent both constituencies. One may argue that the third place candidate with 29% should also be allowed automatic passage to Parliament but in order to contain any possible MP explosions (The current 650 MPs is probably enough) it would not do a third placed MP too much harm to accept a 58% vote from two constituencies, which still does not match the 77% held by the Barnsley MP in the 2001 general election. Indeed there is nothing to stop the second placed candidate doing the same if a neighbouring candidate wins less than 25% of their vote and it is reasonable and practical to commandeer them. The more votes that count, the better it is for both the politician and the electorate.
In another scenario, a contest may see the winning candidate with 80% of the vote and the second placed candidate with only 15%. Whilst the second placed candidate may not have sufficient votes to claim a place as an MP, he or she may still commandeer votes from a neighbouring constituency or concede their votes to a more successful candidate from the same party. It therefore becomes apparent that it is no longer important how many MPs attend Parliament as much as how many people that MP represents.
Party leaders may nominate a candidate to represent more than one constituency with a percentage of vote equal in two constituencies to a winning candidate (by 25% at least) of one constituency. Likewise, the candidates with relatively low votes in a constituency but sufficient votes in a region (or across the country) may represent voters for the said region or as a regional or sole national candidate. To ensure that the said representation is useful and constructive to Parliament, I would suggest that the any representation should equal at least the same 25% won by the lowest winning second placed candidate in any UK constituency.
We currently have around 650 MPs in government. They were elected by a First Past the Post system (FPP), which means that many people who voted against them have no representative for their area in Parliament. The PPR system aims to give voters that representation without increasing the number of MPs.
With about 60 million people in the country, 650 MPs under FPP will have, mathematically, about 92,000 people in each constituency to represent. One presumes that about two thirds of these people are eligible to vote, hence one MP should represent 60,000 voters each on average (See vote average to seat chart). In many cases, however, the winning MP will have received no more than 70% of the votes for his or her constituency. Consequently it is likely that those who did not vote for that particular MP would prefer to seek constituency advice from their preferred political affiliation rather than the elected MP. Therefore it makes sense to have a second placed candidate as an MP whose activity will contribute to the negation of arguments against increasing the size of constituencies. The MP for Barnsley, for example, represented 27543 voters with just 19,181elected votes in their favour. I cannot see that the MP for Barnsley would fare worse if the constituency doubled and he were now responsible for only 38,362 voters; 22,000 less than the potential electorate of his original constituency.
Whilst the percentage of people voting in a particular constituency may decide if an MP is elected, the percentage that the MP is able to wield in Parliament would be calculated as a the number of votes from his or her constituency divided by the total number of votes cast nationally. Therefore the power of the vote that each MP commands is truly proportionate to the UK electorate.
Voters can, therefore, vote for the candidate – or manifesto – of their choice and expect that their vote will count, which according to the results of the 2001 general election would be 99.6% effective; far greater than any other electoral system devised to date. PPR is truly democratic.
Arguments used in favour
- PPR puts the power of the vote in the hands of voters.
- Removes the power of ‘safe seat’ politics.
- Gives minority voters an MP most closely affiliated to their views.
- MPs vote only with the percentage of votes they have won, constituency votes divided by the total election turnout (adjusted for small percentage of minor candidates not elected 113973 votes = 0.04% of the electorate in the 2001 general election. This implies that 99.6% of voters votes are not wasted)
- As with STV, only a party or coalition of parties, who could attract more than 50% if the electorate could form a government. Any changes would have to be backed by a majority since public opinion is reflected fairly in the elections under PPR. This is far more important than that a government should be formed by only one political party.
- Voters can vote for their first choice candidate in so called ‘safe seat’ constituencies and will be guaranteed MP representation if the vote exceeds 25% in that constituency or its equivalent through combining constituencies, or accumulating 25% of the vote (equal at least in votes to the lowest second placed constituency MP) regionally or even nationally.
- PPR is designed to attract the most cost effective representation of the electorate. It allows votes to be counted across constituency boundaries until a prospective MP represents at least 25% of the lowest second placed constituency turnout.
- It is simple for voters.
- There is no need for tactical voting. Even if a party achieves 25% of the lowest second placed constituency vote at a national level, at least one MP will be elected and charged with representing those voters.
- It produces governments that are strong and stable because they are founded on the majority support of the electorate.
Weaknesses
- Some individual MPs with small voter percentages may have to represent the whole country, however, the number of voters are likely to be no greater than 25% of the lowest placed constituency turnout, which means that the number of voters represented need be no greater than that of the highest placed winning candidate.
- Constituencies would be twice as big as they are now but at least two MPs will be represented within them. Regional and National representations may make arrangements for a surgery telephone line or for volunteer representatives (i.e. those candidates who stood for election but did not accrue enough votes).
- There are critics who may say that PPR is no different to STV in that the system could lead to permanent coalition governments but this would only happen if the voters as a whole want it.
- Politicians may dislike it since it would remove power from them and give it to the electors and the notion of safe seats would bear no relevance to the outcome of a general election.
Conclusion
Percentage Proportional Representation (PPR) is a system that offers the electorate the only realistic opportunity to vote for their first choice of candidate AND make their vote count.
PPR is the most democratic electoral system devised. It is the only system that offers over 99% representation to voters first choice.
There is no longer any point to tactical voting. Virtually every vote really does count.
For the first time ever, voters who vote for candidates other than the candidate in a safe seat consituency will have a real democratic voice.
Minority candidates will have the opportunity to become MPs if the they can comandeer voters from a region, or even the country, the is equivalent to the lowest 25% second placed MP.
Votes in the House of Commons will be counted by each MPs democratically elected percentage of the electorate, which will reflect as close as is possible to 'one voter - one vote' rather than one vote belonging disproportionately to one MP.
Supporting information
The first chart shows the actual results at the 2001 general election and how many seat it produced to for each party
2001 general election. Votes for United Kingdom
Electorate 44,403,238
Vote 26,367,383
Turnout 59.38%
Vote 26,367,383
Turnout 59.38%
| Party | Votes | % | Ch.% | Candidates Seats | Lost Deposit |
| Lab | 10,724,953 | 40.68 | - 2.53 | 412 | - |
| Con | 8,357,615 | 31.70 | + 1.01 | 166 | 5 |
| L Dem | 4,814,321 | 18.26 | + 1.50 | 52 | 1 |
| SNP | 464,314 | 1.76 | - 0.23 | 5 | - |
| UKIP | 390,910 | 1.48 | + 1.14 | - | 423 |
| UU | 216,839 | 0.82 | - 0.00 | 6 | - |
| PC | 195,893 | 0.74 | + 0.23 | 4 | 5 |
| UDUP | 181,999 | 0.69 | + 0.35 | 5 | - |
| SF | 175,933 | 0.67 | + 0.26 | 4 | 4 |
| SDLP | 169,865 | 0.64 | + 0.03 | 3 | 2 |
| GP | 161,926 | 0.61 | + 0.41 | - | 132 |
| Ind | 119,304 | 0.45 | 1 | 136 | |
| SSP | 72,516 | 0.28 | + 0.24 | - | 62 |
| SA | 57,553 | 0.22 | - | 96 | |
| S Lab P | 57,288 | 0.22 | + 0.05 | - | 113 |
| BNP | 47,129 | 0.18 | + 0.07 | - | 28 |
| APNI | 28,999 | 0.11 | - 0.09 | - | 5 |
| Spkr | 16,053 | 0.06 | 1 | - | |
| L | 13,685 | 0.05 | - 0.09 | - | 13 |
| UKUP | 13,509 | 0.05 | + 0.01 | - | - |
The second chart shows how much difference the outcome would have been if PPR had been employed instead of FPP
| Party | Seats won in FPP system | Seats won if PPR system used |
| Labour | 412 (55.45%) | 288 (39.5%) |
| Conservative | 166 | 208 |
| L Dem | 120 | 188 |
| SNP | 5 (Stood 5 candidates) | 5 |
| UKIP | 9 | 9 |
| UU | 5 | 4 |
| PC | 4 | 4 |
| UDUP | 4 | 3 |
| SF | 4 | 4 |
| SDLP | 4 | 5 |
| GP | 4 | 4 |
| Ind | 2 | 2 |
| SSP | 1 | 1 |
| SA | 1 | 1 |
| S Lab P | 1 | 1 |
| BNP | 1 | 1 |
According to the second chart, Labour got 55% of the Parliamentary vote with only 39.5% of electors voting for them. 15% of the turnout at the 2001 election equals a staggering 3,955,107 meaningless votes.
The third chart demonstrates how disproportionate the FPP system is and why the Government in power might be reluctant to change it.
National vote average to actual seats – average votes per seat. General election 2001
| Party | Seats | votes per MP seat |
| Labour | 412 | 26031 |
| Conservative | 166 | 50347 |
| L Dem | 52 | 92583 |
| SNP | 5 | 92862 |
| UKIP | 0 | 390910 |
| UU | 6 | 36139 |
| PC | 4 | 48937 |
| UDUP | 4 | 36399 |
| SF | 4 | 43983 |
| SDLP | 4 | 56621 |
| GP | 0 | 161926 |
| Ind | 1 | 119304 |
| SSP | 0 | 72516 |
| SA | 0 | 57553 |
| S Lab P | 0 | 57288 |
| BNP | 0 | 47129 |
Chart 4 shows the results of one constituency where Labour has what is known as a 'safe seat'. Chart 5 shows a marginal seat where it is possible that only a few votes separates the winner from the loser under FPP.
These charts are actual general election results. They have not been altered to reflect the proposed changes in size of constituency. However, what matters here is the percentage of vote attained by each candidate and what it would mean for them in terms of becoming MPs.
| BARNSLEY, CENTRAL | |||||||
| Election | Electors | Turnout | Candidate | Party | Votes | % | Ch.% |
| 1997 | 61,160 | 59.7 | E.E. Illsley | Lab | 28,090 | 77.0 | +6.2 |
| S.P. Gutteridge | C | 3,589 | 9.8 | -8.7 | |||
| D. Finlay | L Dem | 3,481 | 9.6 | -1.2 | |||
| J.J. Walsh | RP | 1,325 | 3.6 | ||||
| 24,501 | 67.2 | ||||||
| 2001 | 60,086 | 45.8 | E.E. Illsley | Lab | 19,181 | 69.6 | -7.4 |
| A.W. Hartley | L Dem | 4,051 | 14.7 | +5.2 | |||
| I.A. McCord | C | 3,608 | 13.1 | ||||
| H. Rajch | SA | 703 | 2.6 | ||||
| 15,130 | 54.9 |
| Results under PPR | |||||
| Election | Turnout | Candidate | Party | Votes | % |
| 2001 | 27543 | E.E.Illsey | Lab | 19,181 | 69.6% |
| A.W.Hartley | L Dem | 4,051 | 14.7% | ||
| IA Mc Cord | Con | 3,608 | 13.1% | ||
| H Rajch | SA | 703 | 2.6% |
Ilsey wins. His 19,181 votes is 0.000727% of the national electorate turnout of 26,367,383. Ilsey would become an MP for Barnsley.
Hartley comes second. His 4,051 votes, however, is not 25% of the constituency turnout. At 14.7% of the constituency turnout it is not enough for Hartley to claim an MP seat. He would need at least 25% of the constituency turnout to do so. By coming second, Hartley may claim his position as MP but would need to commandeer another 2,834 votes from neighbouring constituencies. One would expect that the decision as to who would represent the electorate in this area would be decided by the Lib Dem leadership. It is possible, for example, that if there was a neighbouring constituency where Lib Dem won the constituency that the MP would take on the additional votes (the amount of seats no longer having any advantage). Certainly the Lib Dem party would probably welcome the opportunity to represent their voters in what has traditionally been a Labour stronghold.
| CHEADLE | |||||||
| Election |
Electors
|
T'out
|
Candidate
|
Party
|
Votes
|
%
|
Ch.%
|
1997
|
67,853
|
77.3
| S.R. Day | C | 22,944 | 43.7 | -13.9 |
| Mrs. P. Calton | L Dem | 19,755 | 37.7 | +8.1 | |||
| P.G. Diggett | Lab | 8,253 | 15.7 | +3.3 | |||
| A.S.P. Brook | RP | 1,511 | 2.9 | ||||
| 3,189 | 6.0 | ||||||
2001
|
69,001
|
63.2
| Mrs. P. Calton | L Dem | 18,477 | 42.4 | +4.7 |
| S.R. Day | C | 18,444 | 42.3 | -1.4 | |||
| H. Dawber | Lab | 6,086 | 13.9 | - | |||
| V.L. Cavanagh | UKIP | 599 | 1.4 | ||||
| 33 | 0.1 |
Calton wins. Her 18,477 votes is 0.0007 of the national electorate turnout. Day comes second with 18,444, which is also 0.0007 of the national electorate turnout. Dawber is third with 6,086 and would need another 4,823 votes to become an MP. Cavanagh, with 599 votes is nowhere near the required percentage.
The 2001 results (chart 3) demonstrate that 390,910 voters voted UKIP nationally, which is 0.0148 of the national turnout. According to the winner at Cheadle this proportion of voters would represent 22 seats for UKIP. It is therefore possible that Cavanagh could be selected by UKIP to represent a regional electorate of which Cheadle is a part.
The author is happy to discuss the PPR system with interested parties.
END
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